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the residual variance model, to examine the levels of price and price variation within
and across 10 kinds of physically identical products on eBay UK. The results ﬁnd that
the price levels and price dispersions on eBay are lower than the ones reported in the
prior literature regarding other online markets, but the ’law of one price’ has not pre-
vailed in any sample category. It further suggests an important interaction between
the extent of price dispersion and the heterogeneities of consumers and sellers.1 INTRODUCTION
Online auction markets, such as eBay, have many characteristics of perfect competitive
markets. On eBay, it is likely to have many sellers in a product category; information
is instantaneous and bidders are free to compare the offerings of sellers worldwide si-
multaneously. With hardly seller differentiation, one may expect ﬁerce price competition
for physically identical goods. However, Luo (2008) examines 860 transaction records of
four sample products (Canon 350D digital SLR cameras, Mamas & Papas 2-in-1 prams,
Sony Ericsson K300i mobile phones and Converse All Star shoes) on eBay UK during
the period 21st January to 20th February, 2007. The standard errors of regressions that
show the levels of price variation after having allowed for possible inﬂuential factors
have varied signiﬁcantly between 5% and 20% across the samples after allowing for the
systematic factors. Figure 1 plots the percent ranges of these four samples (i.e. the differ-
ence between highest and lowest auction prices divided by the lowest price) at the date
level. It shows that the respective ranges for Canon, Mamas & Papas, Sony Ericsson and
Converse are 28%, 44%, 98% and 241%. Whereas the ranges for Canon and Mamas &
Papas ﬂuctuate modestly, they vary considerably in Sony Ericsson and Converse. Thus,
this paper empirically investigates the levels of price and price dispersion among a large
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Figure 1: Price Ranges for Four Product Categories on EBay
Various measures of price dispersion have been adopted in the literature. The absolute
measures of dispersion include variance, standard deviation of the distribution, range
between the highest and the lowest prices, gap between two lowest prices and value of
price information (i.e. difference between the average and lowest prices). Meanwhile,
2two relative indicators are coefﬁcient of variation (i.e. the ratio of the standard deviation
to the mean price) and percentage range. Further, Baye et al. (2004) propose another
relative measure of dispersion - the percent gap that is the difference between the lowest
two prices relative to the lowest price. If prices approach marginal costs and ﬁrms are
efﬁcient, theBertrandoutcomeprevailsandthegapmeasureapproacheszero. Inevitably,
different measures may generate different results.
The correct dispersion measure depends on the price distribution and the question of
interest. Although the price theory in literature provides no axiomatic basis for these
standard measures, it is to understand where price differences come from. Thus, the
paper uses the most popular ones in literature: the coefﬁcient of variation, the percent
range and the percent gap. Meanwhile, standard deviation of the normalised price is
included as a double check, since both range and gap depend upon the extremes of price
distribution that can be sensitive to outliers in the sample data. Further, I propose the
residual variance model as a new method that measures the variance of proportional
deviations from the normalised auction prices. To the best of my knowledge, there is
no explicit theoretical basis for this method. However, it is a natural dispersion measure
raised from the price regression, since it is comparable across different products as an
average percentage deviation correcting the product and the auction characteristics. In
the linear case, it corresponds the coefﬁcient of variation roughly.
Although prior studies suggest many reasons for the low online price dispersions, some
studies have found contradicting evidence. Among others, Clay et al. (2001) investi-
gate the price dispersion in the online book industry by studying 399 books in 5 cate-
gories from 32 online bookstores over 25 weeks. They ﬁnd that widely advertised books
have the lowest average price and the highest price dispersion and explain that retailers
discount prices of some popular products to attract consumers into buying bundles of
products. Lee and Gosain (2002) examine the price distributions for music CDs among
9 online retailers and 5 nationwide retailers between February 1999 and January 2000.
They show that the average percent price difference is not smaller online and the disper-
sion depends on whether the product is a popular or a niche product. In a comparison
study by Scholten and Smith (2002), they empirically show that price dispersions in both
retail and online markets were at least as large in 2000 as they were in 1976.
3Besides, a few studies present some interesting relations between price and some mea-
surable characteristics. Brown and Goolsbee (2002) ﬁnd lower price levels of life insur-
ance online and demonstrate that price dispersion initially increases as the number of
informed consumers increases, but the dispersion falls as it increases further. Baye et al.
(2004) ﬁnd that an increase in the number of sellers affects the degree of price dispersion
depending on if and how this change affects the consumer demand. Gatti and Kattuman
(2003) reveal that relative price dispersion falls as the price level rises, so the cheap goods
have relatively greater price dispersion than the expensive goods.
Further, most of studies on online price dispersion use posted prices or click-through
rates published on the price comparison sites and explain price variations at the ag-
gregate level or on a narrow set of markets (typically US books, CDs or computing),
as shown in Appendix A. In contrast, Ghose and Yao (2006) use the actual transaction
prices of 4 product categories from online and conventional markets of government buy-
ers. They ﬁnd that online price dispersion is substantially smaller than that reported in
the prior literature and the ’law of one price’ prevails in some markets. Anderson et al.
(2007) test the price variations for Palm Pilot Vx on eBay and interpret that price disper-
sion on eBay is low relative to the degree of heterogeneity in seller strategies, because of
the market competitiveness for such products. However, the results may be biased by the
product and/or market characteristics, because 1) the analysis involves only one product;
and 2) eBay has developed considerably compared with its early stage in 2001 when the
data was originally collected. Thus, this paper proposes the residual variance method as
a new dispersion measure. Together with the standard measures, it explores the extent to
which price dispersion varies within and across 10 types of physically identical products
in the online auction markets.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 explains the measures of
the price dispersion and methodology used to collect the data, and it provides a descrip-
tion of the data. Regression results for the levels of price and price variation are presented
in Section 3 and ﬁnal conclusions are continued in Section 4.
42 METHODOLOGY AND DATA
2.1 Measures of Price Dispersion
Price dispersion can be interpreted intuitively as the difference between the product price
andtheexpectedvalueofproduct. Thestandardmethodsassumethattheexpectedvalue
of product is a constant equal to the mean. They measure the distribution of prices in a
time period, but the observed dispersion may result from the products being different in
many ways that are not reﬂected. Then, price dispersion is explained at the second stage
of the regression by various factors. Another method assumes the expected value differ
with the product and the auction characteristics, and this variation will increase mea-
sured dispersion. Therefore, residual variance model allows the factors to explain the
variance at the ﬁrst stage. It reduces the heterogeneities of consumers and sellers in the
price-level regression and explores if certain factors have linear or non-linear effects on
the measured dispersion at the second stage. It explains as much price variation as possi-
ble using observed product and auction characteristics and then analyses the remaining
price variation that is left unexplained.
Suppose we observe a set of prices for a product, Pi, where i = 1...N. There is an issue
of measuring how dispersed the observations are. In the theoretical models, dispersion
is usually treated in a very simple way. For instance, Salop and Stiglitz (1982) consider
a market with identical buyers who live for two periods and each buyer has one pur-
chase in each period. Also, some models assume homogenous sellers (e.g. Wilde and
Schwartz, 1979); some assume homogeneous buyers who buy the lowest priced goods
(e.g. Rosenthal, 1980) and some assume homogeneous buyers and sellers (e.g. Diamond,
1971). However, data does not usually come in this form but has a complicated distribu-
tion of prices. As discussed in Section 1, there are a large variety of possible measures of
price dispersion, but they all have some limitations. For instance, when the mean value
is near zero, the coefﬁcient of variation is sensitive to small changes in the mean. The
percent range shows the difference between the highest and the lowest prices and the
percent gap indicates the difference between the lowest two prices relative to the lowest
price. However, both measures can be sensitive to the extreme observations. The most
common absolute measure of dispersion is the variance or standard deviation that is the
positive square root of variance. The variance of Pi, denoted by Var(Pi), is deﬁned as,
5Var(Pi)=E([Pi − E(Pi)]2) (2.1)
Thus, Var(Pi) is the mean squared deviation of Pi from its unconditional expected value
E(Pi). If the distribution of prices is normal, this is a good measure. Any other measures
of dispersion are functions of the variance. Since the observed price data may be skewed,
it is common to take logarithm of prices, log(Pi), and substitute log(Pi) into the measure.
In this sample data, one may expect that the price distribution in each category is skewed
bumping up against the minimum bids as a lower bound. Therefore, the normality of
the data needs to be tested. However, there may be heterogeneity in other characteristics
that inﬂuence the prices, e.g. the nature of the auctions. In those circumstances, the
conditional variance may be a better measure. The conditional variance of a random
variable Pi given the value of Xi is
Var(Pi | Xi)=E([Pi − E(Pi | Xi)]2 | Xi) (2.2)
where Xi is a vector of observed characteristics. Under normality, the conditional expec-
tation of Pi can be written as,
E(Pi | Xi)=β Xi (2.3)
where Pi = β Xi +ui. β is k×1 vector. Therefore, β can be estimated by least squares and




i /(n − k) (2.4)
where ∑ ˆ u2
i is the sum of estimated squared residuals, k denotes the number of regres-
sion coefﬁcients estimated and n is the number of observations. This is an estimate of
the square root of the error variance and gives an idea of the average size of the errors.
However, there may also be systematic factors inﬂuencing the expected price dispersion
and this can be investigated by considering the regression,
ˆ u2
i = γ Zi + vi (2.5)
The possible candidates for Zi are Xi, the squares and cross products of these variables.
The method captures some non-linear effects that are not shown in standard measures.
For instance, prices may be less dispersed in the short or long durations but more dis-
persed when the auction durations are in between. Also, the distribution of prices is
more dispersed with low or high minimum bids but less dispersed when minimum bids
6are in between. These relations can be tested later in the paper. Notice that Equation
(2.5) is the standard White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity test, but its interpretation is differ-
ent. It asks that given certain characteristics of an auction how large is the expected price
dispersion for a product likely to be.
2.2 Data Collection
The data is collected manually via ’Completed Listings Search’ on eBay UK. It is then
transferred into Microsoft Excel and EViews 5 for the regression analyses. Throughout
data collection, I have attempted to capture all the relevant information of auctions and
preserve the originality of the data. However, a few details need to be mentioned: 1) 2.5%
of total auctions without any bid are omitted from the data; and 2) in total of 1606 transac-
tion records, 31 records are omitted since they are located outside the UK; 21 records are
rejected because of the private listings with the hidden number of bidders and bidders’
identities, and 12 records are removed because of the hidden reserve prices. Accordingly,
the sample consists of 1538 observations of 10 kinds of physically identical products in
4 categories between 1st and 31st August 2007. All chosen products are new and have
no size or colour difference. Limiting the data collection to a 1-month span reduces the
likelihood of potential systematic variations that may occur over time. Also, the chosen
categories have different retail values. Four products have the retail prices below £100
and the other six are above £100. Speciﬁcally, the products are:
• HEALTH AND BEAUTY: Oral B Triumph 9900 Electric Toothbrush, GHD IV Styler and Eliz-
abeth Arden 8 Hour Cream (50ml);
• STAMPS: 100 UK First Class Stamps and 100 UK Second Class Stamps;
• CONSUMER ELECTRONICS: Thomson Sky High Deﬁnition 300GB Box, Apple iPhone and
TomTom Go 910 Satellite Navigation;
• VIDEO GAMES: Harry Potter: The Order of Phoenix PlayStation 2 Game and PlayStation 3
Game Console.
Table 1 overleaf presents a preliminary summary statistics of the auction prices. The
mean minimum bids vary between 23% and 75% of the corresponding retail prices across
samples, and 6 out of 10 products are less than half of their retail prices. As discussed in
Luo (2008), sellers tend to set low minimum bids. The differences between the lowest and






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8all the samples are lower than their corresponding retail prices except iPhone, and the
average normlised price is about 0.72. However, the prices still show some variations.
For instance, iPhone was launched in the US in June 2007 (two months before the data
was collected), but it was not ofﬁcially released in the UK till November 2007. EBay was
almost the only source for UK buyers. Although buyers might notice US retail prices, the
normalised price of iPhone stayed high at 1.46. The convenience for looking for a new or
speciﬁc product may increase the willingness-to-pay of a buyer (Shankar et al., 1999).
Table 2: Summary Description of the Variables
Variable Description
MINBID The minimum bid of the auction
UB The number of the unique bidders throughout the auction
DURATION The length of the auction, namely 1, 3, 5, 7 or 10 days
POS The number of users who left a positive rating for the seller
NEG The number of users who left a negative rating for the seller
SELLERFB The total number of feedback ratings of a seller
BUYERFB The total number of feedback ratings of a buyer
SHIPPING The shipping cost and any handling fee stated in auction
Auction Dummy Description
SETBIN 1 if the auction has a buy-price option, 0 otherwise
PRIMETIME 1 if the auction ends between 4pm and 10pm, 0 otherwise
WEEKEND 1 if the auction ends on Saturday or Sunday, 0 otherwise
GALLERY 1 if the auction title includes a picture, 0 otherwise
PICTURE 1 if it lists 1 or more pictures of the product, 0 otherwise
MULTI 1 if the seller is a multi-channel seller, 0 otherwise
Product Characteristic Description
AGE 1 if the product is launched within 1 year till Aug. 2007, 0 otherwise
VALUE 1 if the product’s retail value is GBP100 or above, 0 otherwise
EXPERTISE 1 if the product needs expertise during purchase, 0 otherwise
DAILY 1 if the product is a daily/necessary product, 0 otherwise
LIFECYCLE 1 if the product will be replaced in 6 months, 0 otherwise
In addition, standard deviations of the winning bids ﬂuctuate widely between 2.17 and
62.08. Despite some minor variations, the standard deviation increases as the mean win-
ning bid increases. Also, apart from marginal difference in Second Class Stamps, the
mean Buy-It-Now prices for all other products are higher than their corresponding mean
winning bids. The data shows that more than half of the auctions are ended via buy-price
options, but the choices vary greatly across categories. The auctions of Stamps and Video
Games are ended mainly via bidding, whereas more than half of the auctions in Health
and Beauty sector are ended via buy prices. Regarding the ending time, about half of
9the auctions end during the prime time, while only 24% of the auctions end at week-
ends. Thus, the possible indicators for the analyses are stated in Table 2 and the names of
the variables are given in capital letters. These variables are the same ones used in Luo
(2008), apart from that this paper adds in product characteristic dummies but excludes
’LOCATION’, ’REFURBISHED’ and ’ENDBIN’. Notice that all the samples in this paper
















































Figure 2: Price Dispersion for All the Products under Three Standard Measures
Figure 2 compares the degrees of price dispersion for all the products at the date level.
It uses three standard measures: coefﬁcient of variation, percent range and percent gap.
Despite some differences, the measures remain consistent for most of the samples.
Table 3 overleaf ranks the measured dispersions across samples under the standard mea-
sures. Along Table 1, it indicates various degrees of price dispersion appear before con-
trolling the factors of the product and the auction. The average coefﬁcient of variation,
percent range and percent gap display 10%, 26% and 12% respectively. These are lower
than the results reported in the prior studies in Appendix A. Despite some minor vari-
ations, Tables 1 and 3 reveal that the coefﬁcient of variation and range increase as the
mean winning bid and its standard deviation decrease. It appears to ﬁt into the pattern
of Stigler’s (1961) conjecture. That is, the expected savings of a consumer who purchases
an expensive product would be large, resulting in a greater number of searches. Price
volatility may be relatively lower for high-valued products than low-valued products.
10Table 3: Summary of the Levels of Price Dispersion at the Date Level
Product No. of C.o.V. C.o.V. Range Range Gap Gap
Obs (%) Rank (%) Rank (%) Rank
HEALTH AND BEAUTY
Oral B 31 6.413 2 13.794 2 8.861 4
GHD IV 31 7.690 4 24.116 6 13.068 6
8 Hour Cream 31 16.306 9 42.894 8 28.006 10
STAMPS
1st Cls Standard Stamp 31 17.452 10 46.242 9 13.842 7
2nd Cls Standard Stamp 31 16.277 8 50.190 10 10.310 5
CONSUMER ELECTRONICS
Sky Box 31 1.777 1 5.026 1 2.097 1
Apple iPhone 31 9.413 6 19.687 4 15.052 8
TomTom 31 6.532 3 14.229 3 8.265 3
VIDEO GAMES
Harry Potter 29 11.952 7 20.048 5 18.683 9
PlayStation 3 31 8.952 5 25.048 7 6.329 2
AVERAGE 30.8 10.276 - 26.127 - 12.451 -
In contrast, search costs theory predicts that price variations for homogeneous goods will
be alleviated and may eventually disappear in the online markets because of the reduced
search costs for both price and product speciﬁcs. Especially, price variation is expected to
be low for products with low search costs, typically frequent purchases. One may expect
that UK buyers are very likely to be informed about the prices of UK Standard Stamps
that are sold throughout UK post ofﬁces. On eBay the number of auctions for each type of
standard UK stamps is relatively low, so bidders are able to browse most of the auctions.
However, none of the measures has ﬁtted neatly into the theoretical prediction. Table
3 shows that the Stamp category has the highest ranking for the dispersions of prices
in general. Contrary to the retail prices of First and Second Class Standard Stamps at
£34 and £24, the maximum winning bids in the data are £33 and £24.01 respectively as
shown in Table 1. The total prices including postage are higher than their retail prices.
Meanwhile, the auction prices for Sky Box display the least price variation under each
measure. PlayStation 3 shows inconsistent results across measures: the coefﬁcient of
variation and the price range are ranked at 4 and 7 respectively, while its gap is ranked







































































(b) No. of Observed Auctions
C.o.V. Range Gap
Figure 3: Price Dispersion against the No. of Unique Sellers and Observed Auctions
In addition, some ﬁgures are graphed to observe the impacts of certain systematic fac-
tors. In Figure 3, three standard measures are roughly consistent. Figure 3(a) plots three
dispersion measures against the number of unique sellers at the date level for all the
samples. The level of price variation increases signiﬁcantly when the number of unique
sellers increases from 19 to 41 but drops after. However, it fails to reveal a clear trend as
a whole. Different from other retail and online purchases, consumer demand and auc-
tion prices on eBay are not inﬂuenced by the number of sellers on a particular day but
all similar auctions throughout or even before the auction. An increase in the number of
sellers is associated with either an increase or a decrease in price variations depending
on how it affects consumer demand. The complexity cannot be captured further at this
stage of the analysis. Further, Figure 3(b) exhibits a possible inverse relation between gap






































































(b) Minimum Winning Bid Price (£)
C.o.V. Range Gap
Figure 4: Price Dispersion against Mean and Minimum Winning Bids
Figure 4 compares the impacts of mean and minimum winning bids on the price dis-
persions. It suggests that all three measures decline initially as the minimum and mean
12winning bids increase while they rise after. Consistent with Gatti and Kattuman (2003), it
indicates a possible negative relation between auction ending price and price variation.
Indeed, Section 2 has described many important phenomena exhibited in the sample.
Section 3 will conduct a series of econometric analyses to compare the measured disper-
sions of 10 products under both standard and residual variance methods.
3 EMPIRICAL ANALYSES AND RESULTS
3.1 Price Level
To estimate price dispersion, the section begins the regressions of normalised prices
for both cross and within products. In a homogeneous good market, price variations
mainly come from heterogeneities of consumers and sellers, such as experience of buy-
ers and qualities of sellers in terms of their feedback, auction formats and timing factors.
Thus, the pooled price levels can be estimated by the auction characteristics either with
product-characteristic dummies or product-category dummies. The characteristic dum-
mies may show the effects of systematic factors among products, however the category
dummies will capture the effects of unobserved characteristics of the products. Let us
start the regression with product-characteristic dummies.
3.1.1 Price Regressions with Product-Characteristic Dummies
Table 4: Product Characteristics Across Samples
Product AGE VALUE EXPERTISE DAILY LIFECYCLE
(New) (Expensive) (Short)
HEALTH AND BEAUTY
Oral B   
GHD IV  
8 Hour Cream 
STAMPS
1st Cls Standard Stamp 
2nd Cls Standard Stamp 
CONSUMER ELECTRONICS
Sky Box 




PlayStation 3  
13Having allowed for the characteristic dummies identiﬁed in Table 4, the regression re-
sults are displayed in Table 5 overleaf. The R-squared value suggests that 71% of the
variation in the normalised prices can be explained by the observed product and auction
characteristics. However, R-squared is a relative measure and it is not informative on the
absolute magnitude of the variation left unexplained. Potentially, 29% of the unexplained
variation in the model may still be sizeable.
Table 5: OLS Regression Results with Product-Characteristic Dummies
FULL SAMPLE ANALYSIS - 1538 OBSERVATIONS
Dependent Variable: ln(PL)
Independent Variable Coefﬁcient Std Error P-Value
ln(MINBID) 0.010379 0.004518 0.0217**
ln(UB) 0.034135 0.013717 0.0129**
ln(DURATION) 0.027352 0.008961 0.0023***
ln(POS) 0.020610 0.004044 0.0000***
ln(NEG+1) 0.009260 0.005435 0.0886*
ln(BUYERFB) -0.004277 0.002617 0.1024
ln(SHIPPING) -0.048923 0.002448 0.0000***
WEEKEND -0.041736 0.011621 0.0003***
PRIMETIME 0.022083 0.009644 0.0222**
GALLERY 0.041107 0.015902 0.0098***
PICTURE 0.070479 0.035716 0.0486**
SETBIN 0.053276 0.022863 0.0199**
MULTI -0.249940 0.017928 0.0000***
AGE 0.318440 0.016683 0.0000***
VALUE 0.201465 0.020127 0.0000***
EXPERTISE -0.825966 0.025873 0.0000***
DAILY -0.756063 0.026809 0.0000***
LIFECYCLE -0.232550 0.020273 0.0000***
CONSTANT -0.016811 0.056698 0.7669
R-Squared 0.70777 Mean Dep Var -0.46408
Adjusted R-Squared 0.70430 SD Dependent Var 0.33867
SE of Regression 0.18416 Sum Squared Resid 51.51659
Akaike Info Criterion -0.53375 Log Likelihood 429.4536
Note: Standard errors are listed in parenthesis;
* represents 90% signiﬁcance, ** represents 95% signiﬁcance, *** represents 99% signiﬁcance
Most coefﬁcient estimates provide statistically signiﬁcant results with the expected signs
in accordance with Luo (2008), apart from that the coefﬁcient estimate of ’negative feed-
back’ shows the positive sign and the ’buyer’s feedback’ has an insigniﬁcant result. Re-
garding the effect of negative feedback, the existence of business sellers in the market
may play an important role. Feedback cannot be interpreted in the same way once some
sellers can differentiate themselves by the established reputations. The negative feedback
of these dominant sellers may not show a negative and statistically signiﬁcant impact,
14particularly in the low-valued homogenous product market. Further, with respect to
the product-characteristics, newly-launched (AGE) and high-retail-value (VALUE) char-
acteristics have positive impacts on the normalised price, whereas a daily-use, expertise-
necessary, orsoon-to-be-replaced(LIFECYCLE)producttendstohavealowernormalised
price. In general, the pooled price levels can be explained reasonably by the observed
characteristics of product and auction.
3.1.2 Price Regressions with Product-Category Dummies
Table 6 displays the results for the OLS regressions with product-category dummies.
Contrary to Table 5, the R-squared value has increased to 88% accompanied with a lower
Akaike Info Criterion (AIC) value. It indicates that the product intercepts provide a better
ﬁtting model than the characteristic intercepts.
15Table 6: OLS Regression Results with Product-Category Dummies
FULL SAMPLE ANALYSIS - 1538 OBSERVATIONS
Dependent Variable: ln(PL)
Independent Variable Coefﬁcient Std Error P-Value
ln(MINBID) 0.011517 0.002910 0.0001***
ln(UB) 0.037931 0.008884 0.0000***
ln(DURATION) 0.002283 0.006006 0.7039
ln(POS) 0.003092 0.002628 0.2395
ln(NEG+1) -0.013986 0.003537 0.0001***
ln(BUYERFB) -0.003804 0.001710 0.0262**
ln(SHIPPING) -0.017001 0.001721 0.0000***
WEEKEND -0.011847 0.007488 0.1138
PRIMETIME 0.012594 0.006210 0.0427**
GALLERY 0.059676 0.010679 0.0000***
PICTURE -0.014265 0.023473 0.5435
SETBIN 0.113641 0.014757 0.0000***
MULTI -0.005375 0.013242 0.6849
ORALB -0.534446 0.017128 0.0000***
GHD -0.112332 0.016229 0.0000***
8HR -0.462704 0.018835 0.0000***
1ST -0.228631 0.018676 0.0000***
2ND -0.339404 0.018352 0.0000***
SKY -0.658801 0.015212 0.0000***
IPHONE 0.565290 0.016142 0.0000***
TOM -0.102481 0.015628 0.0000***
HP -0.208915 0.019665 0.0000***
CONSTANT -0.341521 0.036560 0.0000***
R-Squared 0.880287 Mean Dep Var -0.464080
Adjusted R-Squared 0.878549 SD Dependent Var 0.338666
SE of Regression 0.118025 Sum Squared Resid 21.10366
Akaike Info Criterion -1.421006 Log Likelihood 1115.753
Note: Standard errors are listed in parenthesis;
* represents 90% signiﬁcance, ** represents 95% signiﬁcance, *** represents 99% signiﬁcance
The general results of two regressions are consistent. All the estimates exhibit the same
signs under both regressions, apart from that the effect of negative feedback is negative
and highly signiﬁcant in Table 6. All of the product dummies present highly signiﬁcant
and negative impacts except iPhone. It is consistent with Table 1 that the normalised
prices of all the products are lower than their corresponding retail prices except iPhone.
Compared with the regression in Table 5, the effects of DURATION, POS, WEEKEND,
PICTURE and MULTI provide insigniﬁcant results in Table 6. It suggests that product
intercepts provide more explanations for the regression. Since these effects may vary
depending on how these factors affect the demand of the consumer niches, it is necessary
to run the regressions within products.
163.1.3 Price Regressions within Products
The normalised price of product i can be explored within each category as follows:
ln(PL)i = β0 + β1ln(MINBID)+ β2ln(UB)+ β3ln(DURATION)+ β4ln(POS) (3.1)
+β5ln(NEG+1)+ β6ln(BUYERFB)+ β7ln(SHIPPING)+ β8WEEKEND
+β9PRIMETIME+ β10GALLERY+ β11PICTURE+ β12SETBIN
+β13MULTI+ ui
The regression results are presented in Appendix C. R-squared values indicate that be-
tween 20% and 78% of the variance in the normalised prices can be explained by the re-
spective independent variables across regressions. Thus, the explanatory ability of each
regression varies with the product. Overall, the results are consistent with pooled regres-
sions in Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2. The interesting results are highlighted here. Only three
out of ten MINBID estimates are positive and statistically signiﬁcant. As mentioned in
Luo (2008), the effect of minimum bid is expected to be positive, but the effect may be
opposite if the auction with a low starting price attracts the number of bidders and in-
creases bidding competition. Seven out of ten coefﬁcients for UB have the positive sign,
and three of them are statistically signiﬁcant. The effect can be opposite if a large pro-
portion of sellers set high buy prices. For instance, about 84% of GHD are sold through
buy-price options and the average buy price is higher than its average winning bid. Thus,
the number of unique bidders shows a negative and signiﬁcant impact in GHD. Further,
seven WEEKEND coefﬁcients are negative, but it is only statistically signiﬁcant in GHD.
Also, only three out of eight positive coefﬁcients for PRIMETIME are statistically signif-
icant. Consistent with Luo’s (2008) ﬁndings, the ambiguous timing effects reﬂect that
online auctions are less timing-restrictive, particularly when the proportional auctions
with buy prices are high.
Further, six out of eight estimates for MULTI are negative but not all statistically signiﬁ-
cant. The effects vary with the proportional multi-channel sellers, their purposes on eBay
and the auction methods. If a multi-channel seller intends to clear a large quantities of
surplus inventories, the seller is likely to set relatively low minimum bids or buy prices,
as shown in TomTom. Expectedly, its coefﬁcient for MULTI shows a negative and signif-
icant effect at 1% signiﬁcance level. However, the result can vary if these multi-channel
17sellers attempt to expand the market and capture the buyers with different values.
Table 7: Price Level Model Selection with AIC
MODEL K AIC i wi
Price Regression (Characteristics) 19 -0.534 20.105 0.00004
Price Regression (Category Dummies) 23 -1.421 19.218 0.00007
Price Regressions within Products 134 -20.639 0 0.99989
Table 7 compares the AIC values of three price regressions. K is the number of parameters
in the model and i denotes the difference in AIC values between the best ﬁtting model




(Turkheimer et al., 2003). The denominator is the sum of the relative likelihoods for all
candidate models and R is the number of models. Given the data and these models, wi
can be interpreted as the probability that i is the best model. For instance, the regression
with product intercepts is 1.75 (0.00007/0.00004 = 1.75) times more likely to be the best
explanation for the price level than the regression with product-characteristic dummies.
As suggested by Royall (1997) as a general rule-of-thumb for evaluating strength of evi-
dence, the conﬁdence set of candidate models include models with Akaike weights that
are within 10% of the highest. This includes any candidate model with a value greater
than 0.10 (0.99989 ∗ 10% = 0.10), so both pooled regressions lose information. Product-
speciﬁc model provides the most plausible explanation for the price level of the sam-
ple. Further, although some coefﬁcient estimates in product-speciﬁc regressions have not
shown statistically signiﬁcant results, most of the estimates in the pooled regressions are
statistically signiﬁcant. It is possibly because the pooled regressions pick up the cross-
section effects of the systematic factors.
3.2 Price Dispersion - Standard Measures
This subsection estimates a series of regressions in which various standard measures
of price dispersion are used as the dependent variables. Measured dispersions spread
across the positive ranges, but some observations exhibit zero dispersion at the date level.
In fact, the percentage of these observations is larger than what one would expect under a
normal distribution. Of all 308 daily observations, 14 (5%) cases take the value of zero in
the coefﬁcient of variation and the range, and 51 (17%) cases are zero in the gap measure.
18The dependent variables have censored distributions, i.e. they are left-censored at zero.
Therefore, Tobit regression has been adopted as the estimation method.
3.2.1 Price Dispersion Regressions with Product-Characteristic Dummies
The daily price dispersion of product i can be represented as the following regression,
Dispi,m = f(MINBID, UB, DURATION, SELLERFB, BUYERFB, SHIPPING, (3.2)
WEEKEND, PRIMETIME, GALLERY, PICTURE, MULTI, SETBIN,
EXPERTISE, AGE, DAILY, LIFECYCLE) (m = 1,2,3 and 4)
where m is the mth measure of price dispersion. The results are displayed in Appendix
D(a). Three standard methods of dispersion and the standard deviation of normalised
prices, expressed as ratios, are used as the dependent variables. The dummy variables
are equal to 0 if all the auction conditions on a given date are identical, 1 otherwise;
and all other independent variables are the respective mean values on a given date. The
dummy variable, VALUE, is omitted in these regressions, as PRICE is included to con-
trol the product value. In the initial modelling effort, I separated the negative feedback
ratings from total ratings. However, the results are not statistically signiﬁcant, possibly
because the average negative feedback on a given date is very close or equal to zero. Price
variation is more associated with members’ total feedback ratings.
As shown in Appendix D, standard deviations of dependent variables vary signiﬁcantly
from 8% to 29%, while standard errors of the regressions differ from 7% to 25%. The level
of price variation left unexplained remains sizeable, although it has shrunk compared
with the results of prior studies shown in Appendix A. Note that the analyses use the
actual transaction data compared with the posted prices in the other studies. PRICE
effects are positive but not all statistically signiﬁcant, so the product prices may not affect
the levels of price variation. Moreover, except the regression for standard deviation, the
result shows a strong positive relation between SETBIN and all the dispersion measures
at 1% signiﬁcance level with the average coefﬁcient of 0.06. Hence, auctions with buy
prices can boost the degree of price variation by 6% in general. Reynolds and Wooders
(2004) and Hidvégi et al. (2006) explain that if some auctions include the buy prices
19and others involve straight auctions, then in a separating equilibrium, more risk-averse
and/or impatient bidders will go for the buy prices. This may widen price distributions.
Another interesting ﬁnding is that WEEKEND dummies exhibit positive and signiﬁcant
effects at 1% signiﬁcance level in the regressions of coefﬁcient of variation and the range,
and at 10% signiﬁcance level in standard deviation regression. Further, the estimates for
WEEKEND and PRIMETIME suggest that weekend-ending auctions are associated with
higher levels of price dispersion than the prime-time-ending auctions. These reﬂect that
bidding behaviour of the bidders’ are more diverse at weekends within each consumer
group. Also, MULTI effect shows a positive but insigniﬁcant impact.
The estimates for product-characteristic dummies reveal various signiﬁcant effects on
the degree of price dispersion. First, all of the coefﬁcient estimates for AGE are positive
but statistically insigniﬁcant. Thus, a newly-released product is not necessarily associ-
ated with a large dispersion of prices. Second, all of the coefﬁcients for EXPERTISE are
negative and statistically signiﬁcant at 10% signiﬁcance level on average with the mean
coefﬁcient of −0.08. Potentially, an expertise-necessary product may reduce the degree
of dispersion of prices by about 8%. Third, contrary to the coefﬁcients on other product-
characteristic dummies, the estimates for DAILY indicate a wider distribution of prices
for a daily-use product, but the results are statistically insigniﬁcant in the gap and stan-
dard deviation regressions. Finally, the LIFECYCLE impacts are negative and statistically
signiﬁcant on average with the average coefﬁcient of −0.07. Thus, a soon-to-be-replaced
product may reduce the level of price variation by about 7%. As a result, the degree of
price dispersion in a product category is affected by speciﬁc characteristics of that prod-
uct and the auctions of that category.
203.2.2 Price Dispersion Regressions with Product-Category Dummies
Now, letusestimatethedegreeofpricedispersionofproducti usingtheproduct-category
dummies. Thus,
Dispi,m = f(MINBID, UB, DURATION, SELLERFB, BUYERFB, SHIPPING, (3.3)
WEEKEND, PRIMETIME, GALLERY, PICTURE, MULTI, SETBIN,
ORALB, GHD, 8HR, 1ST, 2ND, SKY, IPHONE, TOM, HP)
(m = 1,2,3 and 4)
The detailed results are shown in Appendix D(b). The standard errors of the regressions
differ from 7% to 24%. The AIC value of each measure in Appendix D(b) is lower than its
corresponding value found in Appendix D(a). It implies that product intercepts explain
price variations better than the characteristic intercepts. The duration effects are negative
and statistically signiﬁcant in all the regressions except the gap measure. It hints that
the longer the auction duration, the lower the degree of price dispersion. The estimates
for WEEKEND and SETBIN show the consistent results revealed in Appendix D(a). The
WEEKEND dummies exhibit positive and signiﬁcant effects at 1% signiﬁcance level in
the regressions of the coefﬁcient of variation and the range, and at 5% signiﬁcance level in
thestandarddeviationregression. ThecoefﬁcientestimatesforSETBINshowthepositive
impacts on the measured dispersions except the standard deviation regression. Contrary
to the model with characteristic dummies, the regressions with product dummies show
that the MULTI effects are positive and statistically signiﬁcant at 5% signiﬁcance level
in the measures of coefﬁcient of variation and gap. Further, all the product-category
dummies display highly signiﬁcant effects in the standard deviation regression.
3.2.3 Price Dispersion Regressions within Products
To test for the robustness of above results, the product-speciﬁc regressions are practised
and the results are generally consistent across measures (detailed results shown in Ap-
pendices E - H). The standard errors of the regressions that display the levels of price
dispersion after controlling systematic factors vary signiﬁcantly from 1.3% to 12% in the
coefﬁcient of variation, from 4% to 37.5% in the range, from 3.3% to 33.3% in the gap and
21from 0.6% to 12.9% in the standard deviation. Despite minor variations, the orders of
standard errors of the regression are consistent across all the measures. Speciﬁcally, the
standard errors of estimates are lowest in Sky Box, whereas they are high in Stamps, 8
Hour Cream and Harry Potter Game. These are consistent with the ﬁndings in Table 3
prior to having allowed for product and auction characteristics.
All of the expertise-necessary products, Sky Box, PlayStation 3 Console and TomTom,
display relatively low degrees of price variation. The data reveals that these markets are
strongly dominated by a few business sellers. It conﬁrms the ﬁndings in the regression
with characteristic intercepts that EXPERTISE has a negative and statistically signiﬁcant
effect on price variation. Also, low degrees of price volatility appear for all of the soon-to-
be-replaced products apart from iPhone. IPhone has a relatively short product life cycle
but it was very new to the market. Throughout the sample period, iPhone has not been
ofﬁcially launched in the UK and buyers could only ﬁnd iPhone via search engines, so
sellers on eBay have had temporary market power. Thus, its newly-released character-
istic may partially offset some of other characteristics with negative effects on price dis-
persion. In addition, First and Second Class Standard Stamps exhibit the highest degrees
of price variation among all the samples. Note that Daily is the only characteristic for the
Stamps in the analyses. It is consistent with the ﬁndings in the regression with charac-
teristic intercepts that DAILY is the only product-characteristic dummy that has positive
and signiﬁcant effect on price dispersion. The results are compatible with Stigler’s (1961)
conjecture explained in Section 3 and Gatti and Kattuman’s (2003) ﬁnding that relative
price dispersion falls as the price level rises so cheaper goods typically have relatively
greater price dispersion than more expensive goods.
Apart from the regression for the gap, the coefﬁcients for WEEKEND show positive and
statistically signiﬁcant impacts in 5 out of 10 categories for all other measures. The es-
timates for MULTI have positive and highly signiﬁcant results for the categories domi-
nated by multi-channel sellers, such as Oral B and GHD. Further, the data reveals that
many multi-channel sellers set different starting or buy prices for the identical goods in
different auctions. It may also lead to more dispersed price distributions.
223.3 Price Dispersion - Residual Variance Method
Now, let us examine the residual variance method, as discussed earlier in Section 2
Methodology and Data. It explains the observed variations using the residuals from
product-speciﬁc regressions in Section 3.1.3. Each residual estimates the price that has
been adjusted for the product and the auction factors. Using estimated squared residual
as a proxy for the residual variance, the regressions are speciﬁed with the same inde-
pendent variables in Equation (3.1) and their squares that allow for the non-linearities.
Thus,
ˆ u2
i = β0 + β1ln(MINBID)+ β2ln(MINBID)2 + β3ln(UB)+ β4ln(UB)2 (3.4)
+β5ln(DURATION)+ β6ln(DURATION)2 + β7ln(POS)+ β8ln(POS)2
+β9ln(NEG+1)+ β10ln(NEG+1)2 + β11ln(BUYERFB)+ β12ln(BUYERFB)2
+β13ln(SHIPPING)+ β14ln(SHIPPING)2 + β15WEEKEND+ β16PRIMETIME
+β17GALLERY+ β18PICTURE+ β19SETBIN+ β20MULTI+ vi
where ˆ u2
i is the estimated squared residual from Equation (3.1). Notice that Equation (3.4)
does not include cross products of the variables, otherwise it would run out of degrees
of freedom. The detailed results are displayed in Appendix I. The effects of systematic
factors vary across samples. A simple way of locating the optimal point that generates
the highest or lowest degree of price dispersion within the range is optimisation. The
signiﬁcant results are analysed in Appendix K.
The coefﬁcient estimates for MINBID and the squares in Sky Box and TomTom indicate
statistically signiﬁcant u-shaped effects. The minimum bid is a random variable and the
price is a random variable with some dispersion. The expected dispersion is a function
of the minimum bid. The low levels of minimum bid have large dispersions as do the
high levels of minimum bid, whereas those in between have smaller dispersions. Sta-
tistically, the degrees of price dispersion for Sky Box and TomTom are lowest when the
minimum bids are around £5.76 and £12.18 respectively. Meanwhile, the estimate for
MINBID shows a positive and statistically signiﬁcant linear effect at 5% signiﬁcance level
in GHD and the estimate for MINBID square for 8 Hour Cream has a negative and signiﬁ-
cant linear effect at 10% signiﬁcance level. Thus, a small increase in the level of minimum
bids does not inﬂuence the price variation in 8 Hour Cream, but its distribution of prices
23gets far more dispersed when their minimum bids are at really low level. Overall, the
coefﬁcients for MINBID show ambiguous effects on the price dispersion across products.
The number of unique bidders has an n-shaped and statistically signiﬁcant effect in Tom-
Tom. It has the highest degree of price dispersion when the auction has about 6 unique
bidders which are three times of its average number. Also, the number of unique bidders
has a positive and highly signiﬁcant linear effect on the residual variance in Sky Box.
Timing factors provide various effects across the samples. The highly signiﬁcant and n-
shaped DURATION effect in Sky Box indicates that Sky Box prices are less dispersed in
the short or long durations but most dispersed when the auction durations are about 3
or 5 days. DURATION in PS 3 Console presents a negative and signiﬁcant linear effect
at 10% signiﬁcance level. In addition, the coefﬁcient estimates for WEEKEND shows
a positive and signiﬁcant linear effect at 5% signiﬁcance level in GHD and a negative
and signiﬁcant linear at 5% signiﬁcance level effect in TomTom. PRIMETIME effects are
generally insigniﬁcant in most of the categories, apart from that it has a negative and
signiﬁcant linear effect in Second Class Stamps at 5% signiﬁcance level.
The estimates for POS show the negative and signiﬁcant linear effects in Sky Box and
iPhone at 1% and at 5% signiﬁcance levels respectively. Thus, the higher the positive
feedback ratings, the more consistent bidding results sellers possibly receive. The esti-
mate for squared POS in GHD has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant effect. It implies
that although an increase in positive feedback does not necessarily increase the degree
of price dispersion, but a considerably large increase in the number of positive feedback
ratings will accelerate the price dispersion. Meanwhile, POS shows a statistically signiﬁ-
cant n-shaped effect in 8 Hour Cream and the dispersion is highest when the number of
the seller’s positive ratings is about 66.
Similarly, the coefﬁcient estimate for NEG in Sky Box suggests a statistically signiﬁcant
n-shaped effect in Sky Box. The result further shows that the negative ratings of 2 causes
highestlevelofpricedispersion. ThecoefﬁcientestimatesforNEGshowthenegativeand
signiﬁcant linear effects in GHD and TomTom, whereas it has a positive and signiﬁcant
non-linear effect in 8 Hour Cream. Thus, a few negative ratings may not increase the
degree of price variation in 8 Hour Cream, but a large number of negative ratings will
accelerate its price variation. Moreover, the estimates for BUYERFB show a negative and
24signiﬁcant linear effect in the Second Class Stamps and a signiﬁcant u-shaped effect in
Harry Potter. Statistically, it indicates that the price dispersion is at the lowest when the
number of buyer’s feedback rating is about 76 in Harry Potter.
Regarding shipping charges, the coefﬁcient estimates reveal the signiﬁcant u-shaped ef-
fects in Sky Box and iPhone. The price variation for Sky Box approaches zero when the
shipping cost is about £0.61. The data shows that the minimum postage in Sky Box is at
£10 except a few auctions with almost free postage at £0.01. Thus, shipping cost has gen-
erally a positive linear effect in Sky Box. Similarly, the price dispersion is at zero when
shipping cost is at £0.25 in iPhone. Since its minimum postage is at £3.50 apart from a
very few auctions with almost free postage at £0.01, shipping cost has generally a posi-
tive and statistically signiﬁcant impact in iPhone. In the First Class Stamps, the estimate
for shipping has a negative and statistically effect at 10% signiﬁcance level.
The impacts of gallery and picture features vary with the products. Seven out of ten
coefﬁcient estimates for GALLERY are positive, but only four estimates are statistically
signiﬁcant. PICTURE effects are statistically insigniﬁcant except GHD. In addition, the
estimates for SETBIN show positive and highly signiﬁcant effects for two out of three
beauty products, while the estimates show the negative and signiﬁcant effects for two
expensive and expertise-required products, Sky Box and TomTom. Further, MULTI ef-
fects vary with the products. The coefﬁcients are positive and statistically signiﬁcant in 8
Hour Cream and Sky Box.
Overall, the results provide some useful insights on the price variations for each product.
The price distributions depend on speciﬁc mixtures of observed and unobserved product
and auction characteristics. Some products, such as Sky Box and TomTom, can mainly
be explained by the independent variables, whereas sizeable price dispersions are still
unexplained in the other categories. Table 8 compares the regressions of price dispersion
under various measures. The AIC values indicate that the residual variance method and
within-product regressions are better than pooled regressions. Given the data and a set
of the models, the probability that i is the best model, wi, shows that residual variance
model provides the most plausible explanation for the price dispersion in the sample
data. Pooled-level regressions lose information on analysing where the dispersion of
prices comes from.
25Table 8: Price Dispersion Model Selection with AIC
Model K AIC i wi
Residual Variance Method 204 -59.133 0 1
Price Dispersion Regressions (Characteristics)
Coefﬁcient of Variation 17 -1.913 57.220 3.757E-13
The Range 17 0.268 59.401 1.263E-13
The Gap 17 0.001 59.134 1.443E-13
SD of Normalised Price 17 -2.163 56.97 4.257E-13
Price Dispersion Regressions (Category Dummies)
Coefﬁcient of Variation 23 -2.011 57.122 3.946E-13
The Range 23 0.233 59.366 1.285E-13
The Gap 23 -0.041 59.092 1.473E-13
SD of Normalised Price 23 -2.300 56.833 4.559E-13
Price Dispersion Regressions within Products
Coefﬁcient of Variation 124 -24.610 34.523 3.187E-8
The Range 124 -12.677 46.456 8.170E-11
The Gap 124 -6.761 52.372 4.241E-12
SD of Normalised Price 124 -32.865 26.268 1.967E-6
Further, Table 9 shows that most of the products have nearly zero skewness. However,
a large skewness of 2.64 in Sky Box indicates a right-skewed distribution, and a negative
skewness of −1.44 in 8 Hour Cream shows a left-skewed distribution. Further, Sky Box
has a very high kurtosis value of 32.19, which indicates that the price distribution has a
very high peak and thin tails. This corresponds with the ﬁnding that Sky Box has the
lowest price dispersion under most of the measures.
Table 9: Normality Test on the Residuals of the Product-Speciﬁc Regressions
Product Obs. Mean Median Max Min Std Dev Skew Kurt Jarqu-Bera
Oral B 103 -1.07E-16 0.007 0.077 -0.134 0.045 -0.411 2.539 3.820
GHD 267 -7.16E-17 -0.001 0.173 -0.213 0.043 0.036 8.923 390.310
8HrCrm 86 4.23E-17 0.008 0.312 -0.779 0.156 -1.435 9.094 162.616
1st Cl 122 -1.98E-17 -0.009 0.439 -0.497 0.156 0.065 2.976 0.089
2nd Cl 148 1.07E-16 -0.023 0.491 -0.484 0.154 0.298 3.926 7.475
Sky Box 361 2.71E-17 -0.001 0.116 -0.090 0.014 2.644 32.188 13235.080
iPhone 84 8.26E-18 -0.002 0.389 -0.330 0.119 0.450 4.723 13.236
TomTom 147 2.27E-18 -0.007 0.232 -0.270 0.060 -0.167 8.790 205.995
HP 66 2.94E-17 -0.002 0.467 -0.477 0.128 -0.027 7.062 45.386
PS3 154 -3.01E-17 -0.001 0.233 -0.314 0.081 -0.092 4.674 18.205
26Although some products are slightly left- or right-skewed, many categories reﬂect sym-
metric and normal-like distributions in Table 9. Even if there is no theory, the distrib-
utions of the residuals offer some indications on the origins of price dispersions. Each
bidder can value a physically identical product differently. There is a valuation disper-
sion against the retail price in each product category. If most of the sellers add reserve
prices in their auctions, one may expect that the distributions are skewed bumping up
against the common value as a lower bound. However, seldom sellers of these physi-
cally identical products set reserves for their auctions. Indeed, eBay requires a minimum
reserve price of GBP50 for any auctioned item and charges a non-trivial reserve-price
fee regardless of whether the product is sold. Therefore, the shape of the distribution,
which varies with the proportional sellers who add reserves in their auctions, ultimately
depends on the charges of the reserve prices. Then, depending on the participants of a
particular auction, the price of that auction may become slightly higher or lower. This
’random entry’ is possibly one of the main reasons for the price dispersion of physically
identical goods in the online auction markets like eBay. Then, different degrees of price
dispersion across samples can be further explained by the speciﬁc product and auction
characteristics.
Therefore, the residual variance method provides more explanations than the standard
measures, since it reduces this randomness by allowing for the key factors at the ﬁrst
stage, during the price-level regression. This is consistent with the result of AIC model
selection. Nonetheless, the method cannot eliminate bidders’ random entry completely,
although it helps to pick up the bidders’ characteristics by group. Accordingly, price
dispersion cannot be completely explained by the observed characteristics of the product
and the auctions in that category.
4 CONCLUSION
Along the standard measures, this paper has suggested a new dispersion measure to in-
vestigate the degrees of price variation within and across 10 kinds of physically identical
products on eBay. The results present some new evidence and possible explanations for
the price variations in the online auction markets. The ’law of one price’ has not prevailed
27in any sample category and sellers can avoid the Bertrand outcome, mainly because of
the inevitable heterogeneities of consumers and sellers. Particularly, bidders’ random en-
try cannot be eliminated completely. Thus, equilibrium price dispersions arise on eBay.
However, consistent with some prior literature, such as Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000),
Brown and Goolsbee (2002) and Ghose and Yao (2006), the levels of price and price dis-
persion on eBay are much lower than the ones reported in the prior literature regarding
other online markets. It may be because that the analyses use the actual transaction data
and/or increase market competitiveness on eBay. In particular, huge consumer partici-
pation on eBay has attracted ofﬂine retails to join eBay. This increases its market compet-
itiveness and also hints the possible ability of eBay to extract rents from sellers, which in
turn suggests that price dispersions arise in the online auction markets despite the fact
that total consumer surplus may have increased by inducing competitive pricing and
expanding product varieties.
The empirical ﬁndings under the standard measures and residual variance method are
consistent. Speciﬁcally, the standard measures reveal that the distribution of prices of
an expertise-required or soon-to-be-replaced product tends to be less dispersed, while it
tends to be more dispersed for a daily-used product. It ﬁnds the highest levels of price
dispersion for both First and Second Class Stamps and lowest degree of price dispersion
for Sky Box. Also, the market dominated by the multi-channel sellers has generally a
positive effect on the price variation.
The residual variance method further captures the insights on some linear and non-linear
effects of product and auction characteristics that are not reﬂected under the standard
measures. The results show that while some variables are signiﬁcant on some products,
others are signiﬁcant on others. No one common factor inﬂuences the price dispersion
for all the product categories consistently and persistently. The distributions of the resid-
uals suggest that depending on the participants of a particular auction, the price of that
auction may become slightly higher or lower. Taking bidders’ random entry into ac-
count, different degrees of price dispersion across samples can be further explained by
the observed product and auction characteristics using the residual variance method.
Given data and the candidate models, the model selection conﬁrms that price dispersion
regressions within products explain the observed price variations better than the pooled
28regressions with characteristic or category dummies, and the residual variance model
provides the most plausible explanation for the price dispersions. However, the new
method is still unable to explain the observed price dispersions completely.
Although this sample data has offered many advantages for examining online price dis-
persion, it has still certain limitations. The main one is the difﬁculty in controlling the
number of sellers in the market. As discussed previously, the consumer demand and
auction prices on eBay are not inﬂuenced by the number of sellers on any particular day
but all the similar auctions during or even before the auction period. A continuum of
sellers makes the study hard to predict about the relation between the number of sellers
and the equilibrium price distribution. Nevertheless, the new measure still offers some
important evidence on how and to what extent some systematic factors affect the levels
of price and price dispersion in each category in the online auction markets.
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34Appendix D (a): Results of Tobit Estimations with Product-Characteristic Dummies
Dependent Variable: Measure of Price Dispersion
Independent Variable C.o.V. Range Gap SD of Nor Price
ln(PRICE) 0.012 0.030 0.016 0.022***
(0. 009) (0.029) (0.023) (0.008)
ln(MINBID) -0.006 -0.023 -0.013 0.002
(0.006) (0.021) (0.017) (0.006)
ln(UB) 0.020* 0.051 0.033 0.021**
(0.011) (0.033) (0.026) (0.009)
ln(DURATION) -0.003 -0.014 0.034 -0.005
(0.012) (0.037) (0.029) (0.010)
ln(SELLERFB) 0.000 -0.004 0.004 -0.004*
(0.003) (0.008) (0.006) (0.002)
ln(BUYERFB) 0.001 -0.004 -0.017* -0.001
(0.004) (0.012) (0.010) (0.003)
ln(SHIPPING) 0.003 0.008 0.001 0.001
(0.006) (0.018) (0.014) (0.005)
WEEKEND 0.026*** 0.096*** 0.013 0.016*
(0.010) (0.032) (0.025) (0.009)
PRIMETIME -0.007 0.030 -0.028 -0.004
(0.011) (0.036) (0.028) (0.010)
GALLERY 0.022* 0.070* -0.020 0.014
(0.012) (0.036) (0.029) (0.010)
PICTURE 0.034 0.154** 0.020 0.033*
(0.021) (0.065) (0.052) (0.018)
SETBIN 0.030*** 0.112*** 0.082*** 0.015
(0.010) (0.032) (0.026) (0.009)
MULTI 0.015 0.041 0.052 0.013
(0.013) (0.040) (0.032) (0.011)
AGE 0.026 0.026 0.047 0.003
(0.016) (0.051) (0.041) (0.014)
EXPERTISE -0.042** -0.071 -0.118** -0.087***
(0.019) (0.060) (0.047) (0.017)
DAILY 0.061*** 0.199*** 0.071 0.008
(0.020) (0.064) (0.051) (0.018)
LIFECYCLE -0.057*** -0.125** -0.076* -0.033**
(0.017) (0.053) (0.043) (0.015)
Mean Dep Var 0.103 0.262 0.123 0.073
SD Dep Var 0.091 0.289 0.183 0.077
SE of Regression 0.079 0.251 0.179 0.071
Log Likelihood 312.676 -23.280 17.777 351.095
Akaike Info Criterion -1.913 0.268 0.001 -2.163
Note: Standard errors are listed in parenthesis;
* represents 90% signiﬁcance, ** represents 95% signiﬁcance, *** represents 99% signiﬁcance
35Appendix D (b) Results of Tobit Estimations with Product-Category Dummies
Dependent Variable: Measure of Price Dispersion
Independent Variable C.o.V. Range Gap SD of Nor Price
ln(PRICE) 0.024 0.055 -0.106 0.162***
(0.049) (0.159) (0.125) (0.042)
ln(MINBID) 0.001 -0.004 -0.010 0.009
(0.006) (0.021) (0.016) (0.006)
ln(UB) 0.014 0.031 0.030 0.017*
(0.010) (0.034) (0.026) (0.009)
ln(DURATION) -0.023** -0.063* 0.010 -0.027***
(0.011) (0.037) (0.029) (0.010)
ln(SELLERFB) -0.005* -0.009 -0.010 -0.005**
(0.003) (0.010) (0.008) (0.003)
ln(BUYERFB) -0.006 -0.018 -0.021** -0.007*
(0.004) (0.013) (0.010) (0.003)
ln(SHIPPING) 0.011 0.030 -0.013 0.016***
(0.007) (0.022) (0.017) (0.006)
WEEKEND 0.027*** 0.098*** 0.011 0.019**
(0.009) (0.030) (0.024) (0.008)
PRIMETIME -0.006 0.030 -0.017 -0.004
(0.010) (0.034) (0.027) (0.009)
GALLERY 0.014 0.049 -0.018 0.008
(0.011) (0.036) (0.028) (0.010)
PICTURE 0.027 0.141** 0.037 0.019
(0.020) (0.064) (0.050) (0.017)
SETBIN 0.019* 0.085*** 0.075*** 0.006
(0.010) (0.032) (0.026) (0.009)
MULTI 0.026** 0.065 0.063** 0.017
(0.012) (0.040) (0.031) (0.011)
ORALB 0.021 0.007 0.714 -0.615***
(0.211 ) (0.690) (0.538) (0.183)
GHD 0.017 0.042 0.697 -0.631***
(0.223) (0.728) (0.569) (0.194)
8HR 0.163 0.379 0.626** -0.232**
(0.118) (0.384) (0.300) (0.102)
1ST 0.165 0.378 0.594 -0.311**
(0.157) (0.513) (0.401) (0.137)
2ND 0.159 0.429 0.473 -0.257**
(0.134) (0.439) (0.343) (0.117)
SKY 0.079 0.071 0.585 -0.373***
(0.152) (0.495) (0.387) (0.132)
IPHONE -0.032 -0.118 0.884 -0.845***
(0.298) (0.975) (0.761) (0.259)
TOM -0.045 -0.170 0.748 -0.830***
(0.268) (0.874) (0.683) (0.233)
HP -0.081 -0.228 0.671 -0.826***
(0.254) (0.828) (0.648) (0.220)
PS3 -0.056 -0.143 0.756 -0.899***
(0.286) (0.935) (0.731) (0.249)
Mean Dep Var 0.103 0.262 0.123 0.073
SD Dependent Var 0.091 0.289 0.183 0.077
SE of Regression 0.075 0.244 0.173 0.065
Log Likelihood 333.642 -11.949 30.319 378.183
Akaike Info Criterion -2.011 0.233 -0.041 -2.300
Note: Standard errors are listed in parenthesis;




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































40Appendix I(a): OLS Regression Results for Residual Variances within Products
Dependent Variable: RESIDUAL2
Independent Variable Oral B GHD 8 Hr Cream 1st Cls Stp 2nd Cls Stp
ln(MINBID) 0.003 0.001** -0.003 -0.000 0.002
(0.004) (0.000) (0.036) (0.004) (0.004)
ln(MINBID)2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.032* 0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.017) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(UB) -0.001 0.002 0.019 0.018 0.037
(0.001) (0.003) (0.049) (0.039) (0.037)
ln(UB)2 0.001 0.001 -0.046* -0.010 -0.016
(0.001) (0.001) (0.025) (0.013) (0.013)
ln(DURATION) 0.004 -0.014 0.022 -0.033 -0.040*
(0.022) (0.010) (0.182) (0.034) (0.023)
ln(DURATION)2 -0.001 0.004 0.015 0.010 0.010
(0.006) (0.003) (0.053) (0.011) (0.008)
ln(POS) 0.002 -0.001 0.067** 0.007 -0.026
(0.002) (0.001) (0.026) (0.021) (0.017)
ln(POS)2 -0.000 0.001* -0.008*** -0.001 0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
ln(NEG) -0.003 -0.003** -0.001 -0.007 -0.014
(0.004) (0.002) (0.026) (0.016) (0.015)
ln(NEG)2 0.001 0.000 0.013** 0.006 0.003
(0.001) (0.000) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008)
ln(BUYERFB) 0.000 0.000 0.014 -0.002 -0.013*
(0.001) (0.000) (0.015) (0.009) (0.008)
ln(BUYERFB)2 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.000 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(SHIPPING) 0.001 -0.002* 0.022 -0.033* 0.016
(0.003) (0.001) (0.023) (0.017) (0.011)
ln(SHIPPING)2 0.000 -0.001** -0.021 0.025 -0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.020) (0.009) (0.003)
WEEKEND 0.001 0.001** 0.008 -0.005 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.014) (0.008) (0.009)
PRIMETIME -0.001 0.000 -0.017 0.005 -0.018**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007)
GALLERY -0.001 0.011*** -0.001 0.009 0.015**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.021) (0.007) (0.008)
PICTURE 0.001 -0.030*** - 0.018 0.000
(0.005) (0.004) (0.014) (0.025)
SETBIN 0.001 0.006*** 0.112*** -0.008 -0.007
(0.001) (0.002) (0.032) (0.032) (0.028)
MULTI 0.000 -0.006*** 0.129*** - -
(0.002) (0.002) (0.045)
CONSTANT -0.007 0.040*** -0.071 0.024 0.152***
(0.025) (0.009) (0.199) (0.075) (0.057)
R-Squared 0.216 0.533 0.503 0.218 0.190
Adjusted R-Squared 0.025 0.495 0.360 0.072 0.070
SD Dep Var 0.003 0.005 0.069 0.034 0.040
SE of Regression 0.003 0.004 0.055 0.033 0.039
Akaike Info Criterion -8.950 -8.250 -2.767 -3.842 -3.523
Note: Standard errors are listed in parenthesis;
* represents 90% signiﬁcance, ** represents 95% signiﬁcance, *** represents 99% signiﬁcance
41Appendix I(b): OLS Regression Results for Residual Variances within Products
Dependent Variable: RESIDUAL2
Independent Variable Sky Box iPhone TomTom HP PS 3
ln(MINBID) -0.007*** -0.001 -0.005** -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.001)
ln(MINBID)2 0.002*** 0.000 0.001** -0.002 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000)
ln(UB) 0.004*** -0.018 0.018* 0.002 -0.007
(0.001) (0.023) (0.009) (0.068) (0.007)
ln(UB)2 0.000 0.007 -0.005* -0.010 0.002
(0.000) (0.007) (0.003) (0.025) (0.002)
ln(DURATION) 0.003*** -0.002 0.001 0.008 -0.021*
(0.001) (0.033) (0.006) (0.040) (0.011)
ln(DURATION)2 -0.001*** 0.005 0.002 -0.003 0.006
(0.000) (0.011) (0.002) (0.017) (0.004)
ln(POS) -0.001*** -0.023** 0.003 0.008 0.002
(0.000) (0.010) (0.003) (0.020) (0.002)
ln(POS)2 0.000 0.002 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
ln(NEG) 0.001*** -0.005 -0.006** 0.000 -0.002
(0.000) (0.009) (0.002) (0.018) (0.003)
ln(NEG)2 -0.001*** 0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.001
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.005) (0.001)
ln(BUYERFB) 0.000 0.002 -0.001 -0.026** 0.001
(0.000) (0.006) (0.001) (0.010) (0.002)
ln(BUYERFB)2 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.003* -0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
ln(SHIPPING) 0.001*** 0.011*** 0.001 -0.002 0.001
(0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.020) (0.001)
ln(SHIPPING)2 0.001*** 0.004*** -0.000 -0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000)
WEEKEND 0.000 0.001 -0.005** -0.021 0.002
(0.000) (0.008) (0.002) (0.016) (0.003)
PRIMETIME 0.000 0.007 -0.000 0.012 -0.001
(0.000) (0.006) (0.002) (0.012) (0.002)
GALLERY 0.001*** 0.003 0.016** 0.023 -0.006*
(0.000) (0.016) (0.007) (0.021) (0.003)
PICTURE - - -0.013 -0.002 -
(0.008) (0.047)
SETBIN -0.003*** -0.003 -0.010* -0.006 -0.010
(0.001) (0.014) (0.006) (0.045) (0.006)
MULTI 0.001* -0.017 0.004 0.031 -0.002
(0.000) (0.038) (0.003) (0.036) (0.005)
CONSTANT -0.010*** 0.014 -0.014 0.016 0.031**
(0.001) (0.055) (0.013) (0.107) (0.013)
R-Squared 0.610 0.379 0.416 0.322 0.150
Adjusted R-Squared 0.589 0.194 0.324 0.020 0.029
SD Dep Var 0.001 0.027 0.010 0.040 0.012
SE of Regression 0.001 0.024 0.008 0.040 0.012
Akaike Info Criterion -11.594 -4.385 -6.610 -3.369 -5.843
Note: Standard errors are listed in parenthesis;
* represents 90% signiﬁcance, ** represents 95% signiﬁcance, *** represents 99% signiﬁcance
42Appendix K: Interpretation of the Regression Results
K.1 Minimum Bid
The estimated squared residual of product i can be represented as follows:
ˆ u2
i = a + bln(MINIBID)+cln(MINIBID)2 (.1)
K.1.1 Sky Box
According to Appendix I(b), in the case of Sky Box, Equation (1) becomes,
ˆ u2
SkyBox = −0.007ln(MINIBID)+0.002ln(MINIBID)2 (.2)
To ﬁnd out the level of minimum bid that generates the optimal price dispersion for Sky






e1.75 = 5.755 (.3)
Taking the second order condition gives
∂2 ˆ u2
SkyBox
∂ln(MINIBID)2 = 0.004 > 0. Thus, the minimum
bid in Sky Box has a u-shaped effect. The low and high levels of minimum bids have
large dispersions, whereas those in between have smaller dispersions. Price dispersion
for Sky Box is at the lowest when the minimum bid is at £5.76.
K.1.2 TomTom
Similarly, the equation for TomTom is
ˆ u2
TomTom = −0.005ln(MINIBID)+0.001ln(MINIBID)2 (.4)






e2.5 = 12.182 (.5)
43The positive second derivative gives
∂2 ˆ u2
TomTom
∂ln(MINIBID)2 = 0.002 > 0. Similar to Sky Box, the
price dispersion for TomTom is lowest when minimum bid is about £12.18.
K.2 Number of Unique Bidders
The effect of number of unique bidders on the estimated squared residual of product i is
given:
ˆ u2




TomTom = 0.018ln(UB) − 0.005ln(UB)2 (.7)






e1.8 = 6.050 (.8)
Taking the second order condition gives
∂2 ˆ u2
TomTom
∂ln(UB)2 = −0.01 < 0. Thus, the price variation
for TomTom is at its maximum when the number of unique bidders is about 6.
K.3 Auction Duration
The duration effect on the estimated squared residual of product i is shown as follows:
ˆ u2




SkyBox = 0.003ln(DURATION) − 0.001ln(DURATION)2 (.10)






e1.5 = 4.482 (.11)
Given the negative second derivative,
∂2 ˆ u2
TomTom
∂ln(UB)2 = −0.002 < 0, both short and long auc-
tions have small dispersions, and those in between have larger dispersions. The disper-
sion is at the highest when the auction duration is about 3 or 5 days.
K.4 Positive Feedback
The estimated squared residual of product i is shown as follows:
ˆ u2
i = a + bln(POS)+cln(POS)2 (.12)
K.4.1 8 Hour Cream
Equation (12) becomes,
ˆ u2
8HrCream = 0.067ln(POS) − 0.008ln(POS)2 (.13)






e4.188 = 65.891 (.14)
Given the negative second order condition,
∂2 ˆ u2
8HrCream
∂ln(POS)2 = −0.016 < 0, the price variation
for 8 Hour Cream has an n-shaped effect and it is largest when the number of seller’s
positive ratings is about 66.
K.5 Negative Feedback
The estimated squared residual of product i is shown as follows:
ˆ u2




SkyBox = 0.001ln(NEG) − 0.001ln(NEG)2 (.16)






e0.5 = 1.649 (.17)
Given the negative second derivative
∂2 ˆ u2
SkyBox
∂ln(NEG)2 = −0.002 < 0, both low and high nega-
tive ratings generate small dispersions, whereas those in between have larger dispersions
and it is the highest when the negative ratings are about 2.
K.6 The Feedback of a Buyer
The estimated squared residual of product i is shown as follows:
ˆ u2




HP = −0.026ln(BUYERFB)+0.003ln(BUYERFB)2 (.19)






e4.333 = 76.172 (.20)
The second derivative gives
∂2 ˆ u2
HP
∂ln(BUYERFB)2 = 0.003 > 0. The buyers’ feedback has a u-
shaped effect. The low and high levels of buyers’ feedback have large dispersions. The
dispersion is at the lowest when the number of the buyers’ feedback ratings is about 76.
46K.7 Shipping Cost The shipping cost effect on the estimated squared residual of product
i is shown as follows:
ˆ u2
i = a + bln(SHIPPING)+cln(SHIPPING)2 (.21)
.0.1 K.7.1 Sky Box
Equation (21) becomes,
ˆ u2
SkyBox = 0.001ln(SHIPPING)+0.001ln(SHIPPING)2 (.22)






e−0.5 = 0.607 (.23)
Given the positive second order condition
∂2 ˆ u2
1stamp
∂ln(SHIPPING)2 = 0.002 > 0, the estimate for
shipping cost in Sky Box has a signiﬁcant u-shaped effect and the price dispersion is at
the lowest when the postage is £0.61.
.0.2 K.7.2 Apple iPhone
Equation (21) becomes,
ˆ u2
iPhone = 0.011ln(SHIPPING)+0.004ln(SHIPPING)2 (.24)






e−1.375 = 0.253 (.25)
Given the positive second order condition
∂2 ˆ u2
iPhone
∂ln(SHIPPING)2 = 0.008 > 0, it has a u-shaped
effect. The lowest level of dispersion is when the shipping cost is £0.25.
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